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In 1923, Dean Wigmore prophesied that if science ever devised
a psychological test for the evaluation of witnesses, the law would
run to meet it.1 Such has not been the case. Instead, American
courts have traditionally excluded any type of psychological test
that evaluates witnesses. This note will introduce the polygraph
technique through a discussion of its historical development, the
technique itself, and its fundamental assumptions. Following this dis-
cussion, case law and recent trends involving the admissibility of
polygraph evidence will be considered. The final segment of this
note will confront the issue of whether or not polygraph testimony
should be admitted.
II. HISTORY
Throughout history, philosophers, theologians, scientists, and law-
yers have sought methods for seeking and determining the truth.
2
The ancient world believed that practical inferences could be drawn
from certain physiological phenomena. The Ancient Chinese formu-
lated a test where the suspects were forced to chew rice powder.
If it remained dry, they were deemed guilty.8 The Ancient Greeks
also discovered that practical inferences could be drawn from cer-
tain physiological phenomena. From 300-250 B.C., the Greek born
physician Erasistratus attempted to detect emotion by measuring
and recording the change in a subject's pulse rate during emotional
situations. 4
Nevertheless, the systematic use of measurements of physiologi-
cal reactions in a scientific manner of deception detection has a
relatively short history. Most authorities have agreed that the modern
1. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1923).
2. Streeter & Belli, The "Fourth Degree": The Lie Detector, 5 VAND. L. REV. 549, 549-50
(1951). The authors argue that the field of law has been especially unsuccessful having
failed with the wheel, the inquisition, the rack, and the third degree.
3. Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the Lie Detector, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 52
& n.30 (1958).
4. Note, Licensing of Detection of Deception Operators in Illinois, 41 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
115, 116 (1964). For a further discusion of the historical development of lie detection
from the ancient world to the turn of the cenury, see Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection,
29 J. CRim. L. & C. 848 (1939).
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history of scientific detection of deception commenced in 1895 when
the Italian Criminologist Ceasare Lombroso published his findings
on the change in pulse and blood pressure of an accused when
questioned about a crime. 5 Lombroso used the same instrument
as medical doctors of 'his time were using to measure blood pressure.
Hence he made no claim of having invented a "lie detector" in the
present day acceptance of the word." Lombroso's work went unac-
claimed and research in this area lagged until 1914.
Shortly thereafter, Austrian psychologist Benussi reported on the
results of respiration and its relationship to deception. Benussi's de-
vice consisted of an elastic rubber tube strapped around the suspect's
chest and was connected to a recording mechanism. With this device,
Benussi was able to reflect a suspect's inspiration and expiration
pattern of breathing in graphic form.7 Benussi's counterpart in the
area of blood pressure measurement was William M. Marston. Mars-
ton's 1915 work at Harvard demonstrated the practicality of detecting
deception with the, systolic blood pressure test."
What might be the most significant event in the historical de-
velopment was the 1921 invention of the ink "polygraph" by Dr.
James MacKenzie, a famous heart specialist at Berkeley. Although
MacKenzie initially intended it for medical purposes, his young stu-
dent, Dr. John A. Larson, put it to use in detecting a dormitory
thief.9 The MacKenzie machine was basically the same instrument
as the blood pressure, pulse, and respiration recorders used today
for lie detection tests except that it was composed of several bulky
testing units unlike the present-day compact polygraphs.
Within a short time following MacKenzie's machine, a series of
"lie detectors" were put on the market. The most significant of
these was the device that Leonarde Keeler introduced in 1926. Though
it was not the first "lie detection" instrument, it was the first de-
signed specifically for police use and has since become the standard
instrument of the trade.0 Keeler's device consists of a cardiograph
for pulse rate, a sphygmograph for blood pressure, a pneumograph
for the respiratory movement, and the galvanograph to record gal-
vanic reflexes. Keeler calls it the "pneumo-cardio-sphygmo-galvano-
graph" or for short the polygraph." The unique contribution to the
polygraph development made by Keeler's machine was that it in-
cluded a galvanometer for recording perspiration increases through
5. Laymon, Lie Detectors--Detection by Deception, 10 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1965).
6. Id.
7. Highleyman, supra note 3, at 53.
8. Note, supra note 4, at 116 citing Marston, Systolic Blood Pressure Symptoms of De-
ception, 21 J. Exp. PSYCH. 117 (1917).
9. Highleyman, supra note 2, at 53 & n.35.
10. Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector", 40 IOWA L. REV. 444 (1955).
11. Keeler, Debunking the "Lie Detector", 25 3. CRIM. L. & C. 153, 157 (1934). Keeler
himself says it can only be erroneously called a lie detector.
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measuring increases in the electrical conductivity of the skin sur-
face.1 2 Nothing new was added to Keeler's polygraph until 1945 when
John Reid invented an instrument for recording unobserved muscular
activity as another index of deception. 8
III. THE INSTRUMENT AND THE TECHNIQUE
Lie detection is an extremely complicated procedure; in fact,
it is probably more complicated than its proponents wish to ack-
nowledge.1 4 The polygraph draws upon an integration of the relatively
new scientific studies of biology and psychology. The polygraph is
not an instrument which can mechanically determine whether a sus-
pect is lying.' 5 The polygraph examination is a complex relationship
among the examiner, the examinee, and the test instrument. The
usefulness of the polygraph depends entirely on the way the examiner
functions in this tripartite relationship, on how he questions and in-
terprets the physiological responses. 6 To further complicate the lie
detection process, examiners are also instructed to base their findings
on various behavior patterns which the polygraph doesn't even re-
cord.
17
The foremost experts in polygraph development, Fred Inbau and
John Reid, state that any reliable polygraph instrument must include
units to measure respiration and blood pressure-pulse changes.1
Sometimes a device is added to the basic test to disclose involun-
tary tightening of arm or leg muscles. For this test, the feet are
hooked to a platform and the arms are connected to the armrests.' 9
Less commonly used is the galvanometer which consists of two elec-
trodes attached to the subjects hand to measure the galvanic skin
response. This galvanic skin response is simply the measuring of
the flow of electric current across the hand as the perspiration rate
increases. For a variety of reasons this test is considered less sat-
12. Laymen, supra note 5, at 2.
13. Id.
14. Skolnick, An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1961). Skolnick
states, "as compared with fingerprints it requires more personal judgment, and is less
straight forward in its scientific underpinnings than blood-alcohol tests."
15. Inbau & Reid, The Lie-Detector Technique: A Reliable and Valuable Investigative
Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 470, 471 (1964).
16. Comment, The Polygraph in Private Industry: Regulation or Elimination, 15 BUFFALO
L. RLv. 655, 659 (1969).
17. Radek, The Admissability of Polygraph Results in Criminal Trials: A Case for the
Status Quo, 3 LoYoLA UNIv. L.J. 289, 291 (1972). The author cites what Reid and Inbau
set out as characteristics of liars: a lack of frackness, looking away from the examiner,
crossing his legs, using his hands in trying to dust off his clothes or engaging in other
similar physical activity.
18. Inbau & Reid, supra note 15, at 471. A pneumograph is used to measure respiration
patterns. It is a device based on a corrugated rubber tube which is fastened around the
chest and which expands and contracts as the subject breathes. A cardio-phygranometer
is used to measure blood pressure and pulse variations. This device resembles the inflated
rubber cuff -that phyieians use to measure blood pressure and pulse rate. Comment, supra
note 6, at 658.
19. Highleyman, supra note 3, at 54.
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isfactory.2 0 The polygraph, in sum, consists of each of these devices
activating a pen that records the particular physiological response
from which the operator makes his interpretations and bases his
questions.
Before the lie detector examination begins the operator should
conduct a pre-test interview with the subject. Inbau and Reid stress
that at this time the polygraph's alleged "'infallibility" should be
impressed on the subject.2' Thus the innocent will tend to be more
relieved and the guilty more likely to be frightened which will have
the practical advantage of heightening their responsiveness. 22 The
examiner should also conduct a "trial run" or pre-test to establish
what is the subject's responsive norm. Here questions aimed at
achieving "normal" responses are asked.
2 3
The standard test takes between 45-60 minutes. The questions
must be unambiguous, unequivocal, and understandable. All questions
and answers as well as lapse of time should be recorded. The ex-
amination room should be free from noise, interruption, and other
extraneous influences. This would rule out, notwithstanding the rules
of evidence, a polygraph examination being able to be carried on
in a court room.
2 4
Two main types of questioning techniques are available to the
examiner during the actual polygraph examination. The first is the
peak of tension technique and the second is the control question
technique.
In the peak of tension technique, the subject is given a list of
questions and is told to answer "no" to all. Only one of the questions
is relevant to the crime and it should involve some detail of the
crime that would be known only to the perpetrator or to an accom-
plice. The theory behind this technique is that a "peak" will show
on the graph because the guilty subject will recognize the crucial
detail and will react to it more strongly than to the others, thus
implicating himself.
2 5
The "control" question technique involves the use of relevant
questions, irrelevant questions, and control questions. In this type
of questioning, it can be said the subject is led into a lie and
20. Id. at 54, citing Harman & Arthur, The Utilization of the Reid Polygraph by Attor-
neys and the Courts, 2 CRIM. L. REV. 12, 21 (1955).
"It is argued that the psychogalvanometer measure only the sensory concomitants and
therefore alcdhol and narcotics tend to impair the efficacy and reliability of results by
reducing physiological reactions." Id.
21. Inbau & Reid, supra note 15, at 471.
22. Id.
23. Highleyman, supra note 3, at 55. These questions were designed to envoke normal
responses which develop "normal" base lines on the graphs, which will be used In inter-
pretation of the subject's reactions to more pertinent questions.
24. Highleyman, supra note 3, at 55.
25. Note, The Polygraph Technique; A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 330, 332
(1970).
this lie is used to provide a norm of the subject's reaction when
lying.26 The control question should basically be a question to which
the subject in most instances would lie. The theory of this technique
is that the innocent suspect would have greater physiological re-
sponses to the control question than to the relevant questions involv-
ing the crime.
27
Each exam usually will not exceed ten questions or five min-
utes.28 After the initial exam, several reruns of the exam are not
unusual. Rarely can an examiner detect deception through the ini-
tial exam. To establish a definite diagnosis, the exam must be re-
run until the responses consistently indicate either truth or decep-
tion .2 9
IV. OPERATIONAL THEORY
Some authors have stated that the fundamental premises under-
lying the polygraph consist of two assumptions: (1) that there exists
a definite relationship between conscious lying and emotional con-
flict; and (2) that the subject's emotional conflict creates a corres-
ponding physiological change.3 0 At least one author has recognized
that there exist two additional assumptions in the basic premises
of polygraph theory: (1) that these physiological changes can be
recorded and measured by a polygraph; and (2) that the examiner
is able to accurately interpret these recordings. 1 These assumptions
should be kept in mind when reviewing the general reluctance of
the courts to admit polygraph results into evidence.
V. REVIEW OF CASES
Frye v. United States,3 2 decided in 1923, is the first reported
American decision dealing with the admissibility of lie detector test
results. The test in question involved Marston's systolic blood pres-
sure deception test. The defendant had been convicted of murder
and appealed on the ground that it was error for the lower court
to disallow testimony offered by an expert witness as to the favorable
results of the deception test made on the defendant. The Appellate
26. Hutchinson, A Review of the Current Status of Lie Detection, 3 CRIM. L.Q. 473, 475
(1960-61).
27. Burack, A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method, and Limitations of the Lie De-
tector, 46 J. CaiM. L. & C. 414, 419-20 (1955). Burack criticizes the control question tech-
nique because known lie reactions to the relevant questions may be less marked in the
case of a truthful subject who may be less concerned about lying involving a trivial mat-
ter than being questioned about a serious crime.
28. Inbau & Reid, supra note 15, at 471.
29. Bighleyman, supra note 3, at 57.
30. Note, The Polygraph and Probation, 9 IDAHo L. REv. 74, 75 (1972); Note, supra
note 25, at 332.
31. Burkey, Privacy, Property and the Polygraph, 18 LA. L.J. 79, 79-80 (1967).
32. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Court affirmed the decision refusing the offer of such evidence. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not
yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify
the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.83
This language established the standard for admissibility that has
been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases involving lie detector evi-
dence. The Court went on to state that the evidential force of the
scientific technique must be recognized only when it has crossed the
line between experimental stage to the demonstrable stage. The
opinion also stated that courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony that is founded on a well recognized principle or
theory, but the technique from which the deduction is made must
have gained recognition in the particular field in which it belongs."'
Although 41 years have passed and Marston's systolic blood pressure
deception tests have been replaced by the more complex Keeler and
Reid polygraphs, the courts still cling to the Frye decision in pro-
claiming that lie detector test results are inadmissible because they
have not gained sufficient scientific recognition as competent legal
evidence.8 5
After Frye a series of cases arose holding polygraph evidence
inadmissible reiterating the Frye rationale.86 The case of State v.
Lowry 7 deserves special attention, because the Kansas Supreme
Court laid down some specific objections to admission of polygraph
test results. The defendant and the prosecuting witness, at the sug-
gestion'of the trial court, submitted to polygraph tests but they did
33. Id. at 1014.
34. Wicker, The Polygraph Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711,
715 (1953) citing the 14th Annual Report of the Judicial Council: "It is Interesting to note
that although the defendant was convicted In the Frye case and sentenced to life imprison-
ment, the excluded blood pressure test results indicating his innocence was subsequently
corroborated when a third person confessed that he was the actual murderer." Id.
35. State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950). In this North Dakota case the
trial court refused to permit a polygraph examiner to testify as to the results of a test
given to a defender. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court noting that the polygraph
might serve a useful purpose In investigation, but not as evidence in court upon the truth-
fulness of a party's statement. Id. at 885, 46 N.W.2d at 520.
36. The next reported case regarding the admissibility of lie detctor test results was
decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court ten years later In State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651,
246 N.W. 314 (1933). The court concurred in the reasoning of the Frye decision when the
defendant attempted to Introduce the results of a Keeler polygraph test. The court held the
evidence was Inadmissible on the ground that lie detector testing had not reached a stage
that would warrant judicial acceptance of the results. The New York Court of Appeals
ruled similarly In People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938). The Court held
that the lie detector did not possess such scientific recognition as to justify the admission
of expert testimony deduced from such a test. The broad assertion of the lack of "scientific
recognition" continued to bar the admissibility of lie detector results in the early 1940's.
The Michigan Supreme Court In People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942),
held that there exists no scientific recognition that there is any certainty behind the test's
results.
37. 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947).
684'
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not agree to the results of the tests being admitted into evidence.
The State, over defendant's objection, was permitted to introduce
the polygraph results by the trial court. However, the Supreme Court
3f Kansas overturned the decision. The court argued that although
the examiner could be cross-examined, the instrument itself would
escape cross-examination. The court also noted that the instriment
might not be able to handle correctly physical abnormalities certain
subjects might have, be it nervousness or unresponsiveness. The
court finally added that the polygraph had not yet gained scientific
recognition and accuracy sufficient enough for being admitted into
evidence.88
Another case with some special significance is the case of Boeche
v. State." Although the majority of the court held polygraph test
results inadmissible for the standard reasons that it lacked general
scientific recognition and reliability, the concurring opinion by Judge
Chapell disagreed with the majority's rationale. Judge Chapell argued
that a proper foundation had not been laid to qualify the operator
nor the polygraph instrument, but that if a sufficient foundation
would have been laid, the test results would have been admissible. 40
This appears to be the first time that an appellate judge had sug-
gested that the polygraph had gained scientific recognition.
1951 marked the appearance of two significant cases. In Hender-
son v. State, 41 the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals held that
polygraph results were inadmissible in the absence of a demonstra-
tion that the polygraph was accurate and had gained scientific rec-
ognition. The court noted that the polygraph was correct in 75 per
cent of the cases and that tension, abnormalities and unresponsive-
ness were the causes for the 25 per cent failure rate.42 The court
also insisted that the polygraph was unlike handwriting, fingerprint-
ing, and x-ray testimony by an expert. The court held that those
devices:
[R]eflect demonstrable physical facts that require no com-
plicated interpretation predicated upon the hazards of un-
known individual emotional differences, which may and often
times do result in erroneous conclusions.
43
A second case decided in 1951 appears to be the first reported ap-
pellate decision to involve the admissibility of polygraph test results
38. Id. at 628, 185 P.2d at 151.
39. 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
40. Id. at 384, 37 N.W.2d at 600.
41. 95 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951).
42. Id. at -, 230 P.2d at 501; Inbau, Some Avoidable Lie Detector Mistakes, 40 J
CPim. L. & C. 791, 792 (1950). Inbau argues that the remaining 25 per cent is not en-
tirely error, but that 4/5ths of this represents cases where the examiner was unable tW
make a diagnosis. Id.
43. Henderson v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 45, -, 230 P.2d 495, 502 (1951).
685
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in a civil action." During the original trial, the judge declared that
he would not decide the case until both parties submitted to a poly-
graph test. The tests were administered and the results were admit-
ted into evidence. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that the admission of the test results was improper, but that this
was not reversible error in view of other evidence in the case.4
5
The court found the admission of the test results was improper, be-
cause the lie-detector was still in the experimental stage.4 1
Besides the standard rationale for the exclusion of the polygraph,
certain courts have raised other objections. In United States v.
Stromberg,47 a federal district court stated that to admit lie detector
evidence would be to supplant the function of the jury-the very
bulwark of our legal system. The court also held that the expert's
testimony would violate the rule against hearsay evidence, because
a machine could not be examined or cross-examined.
48
In People v. Davis,49 the Supreme Court of Michigan held poly-
graph test results inadmissible, because of the great weight such
tests would carry in the minds of the jury. To overcome this danger
the court argued that the examiner's qualifications and the machines
themselves must become more standardized.5 0 The Michigan Court
reviewed the case law on the admissibility of polygraph test results




Since the results of lie detector tests have been held inadmissible
as evidence when offered by either the prosecution or the defense,52
the courts generally will not permit a collateral reference to such
tests.5 8 The courts have held it to be improper for any witness or
counsel to make reference to the fact that the defendant had sub-
mitted to a polygraph examination. The Supreme Court of Minnesota,
in State v. Kolander, 54 held that lie detector test results were inad-
missible and that it was reversible error to allow testimony that
44. Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951).
45. Id. at 611, 50 N.W.2d at 174.
46. Id. at 610, 50 N.W.2d at 174 citing People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503
(1942).
47. 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
48. Id. at 280.
19. 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955).
50. Id. at 371, 72 N.W.2d at 281.
51. Id. at 370, 72 N.W.2d at 281. The recent cases dealing with the admissibility of
polygraph tests results have added no new reasons for rejection. The more recent cases
have relied on earlier precedent and earlier rationales. See State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704,
120 S.E.2d 169 (1961).
52. Peterson v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 255, 257, 247 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1951).
53. State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603 (1969).
54. 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952). Accord Barber v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 246,
142 S.E.2d 484 (1965).
686
defendant had refused to submit to such a test. The theory is that
this testimony, in effect, reveals the probable results of the polygraph
test and a jury might take the defendant's willingness or unwilling-
ness into account in determining innocence or guilt.
People v. Carter5 5 recognized that there might be a situation
when suspect will refuse to take the test out of fear that a lie de-
tector will fail to show his actual innocence. A suspect's reason for
refusal to take the lie detector test cannot always be assumed to
be that he fears the lie detector will unveil his guilt. The court
also argued that a statement by the defendant showing his willing-
ness to submit to a lie detector test would be a self-serving act,
because he runs no risk knowing that the results cannot be used
against him.56
The courts have also held that there exists no right to pre-trial
discovery of polygraph evidence.57
The decisions are generally uniform in holding that the admis-
sion of lie detector results is error and that any collateral references
involving lie detector test results is error.5 The courts are, hwever,
divided on how they view this error. Some courts treat it as revers-
ible error, 9 while other courts treat it as error that can be overcome
by striking the testimony and by an admonition instruction from
the bench to the jury. 0 Usually the result has depended upon the
effectiveness of the trial courts instruction.8 1 However, in a crimi-
nal case it is generally reversible error that cannot be corrected
by an admonition to the jury, whether reference to a polygraph
exam directly related to the test results62 or was merely a collateral
comment. 3
VII. STIPULATION EXCEPTION
There has been a slow trend departing from the traditional rule
of Frye in which polygraph evidence has been admitted pursuant
55. 48 Cal. 2d 737, 812 P.2d 665 (1957).
56. Id. at 752, 312 P.2d at 674.
57. This argument was also adopted in Commonwealth v. Sanders, 886 Pa. 149, 125
A.2d 442 (1956). Nevertheless, identifying a witness as a lie detector examiner Is not
error in itself, because no inference can be raised as to the results of any test. People v.
Sammons, 17 Ill. App. 2d 316, 161 N.E.2d 322 (1959).
58. State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, - , 449 P.2d 603, 606 (1969). Both the Supreme
Court of Delaware, In State v. Thompson, 50 Del. 456, 134 A.2d 266 (1957), and the Su-
preme Court of Arizona, In State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261 (1962), have held
that the accused has no right to pre-trial discovery of the results of polygraph tests, be-
cause the test results themselves could not be used in evidence by either the prosecution
or defense.
59. E.g., State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952) ; People v. Wochnick,
98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
60. E.g., People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App. 2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d 893 (1958).
61. Marble v. State, 319 S.W.2d 451 (Tenn. 1958). The Instructions are aimed at counter-
ing the tendencies of juries to give conclusive weight to polygraph evidence.
62. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947).
63. People v. Aragon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957).
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to a stipulation by the parties. The results of such a polygraph ex-
amination have been admitted when both the prosecution and the
defense have stipulated in writing upon the admissibility of the test
findings, prior to the taking of the test.
LeFevre v. State64 was the first appellate case to deal directly
with the admissibility of polygraph test results where there existed
a signed stipulation. The defendant agreed to take a lie detector
test requested by the prosecution. At trial the defendant attempted
to offer the test results to prove his innocence. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court gave no effect to the stipulation and relied on earlier
decisions6e 5 holding the polygraph evidence inadmissible for lack of
scientific recognition. It should also be noted that the court did not
comment on the absence of the operator at trial and, therefore,
the LeFevre case may not have relied on their unavailability.16
This case was followed by People v. Houser67 in 1948, wherein
the defendant and his counsel signed a written stipulation with the
prosecution. Both parties agreed that the defendant would submit
to a polygraph test and that the findings of the operator could be
offered as evidence by either the state or the defendant. The results
ptroved to be unfavorable to the defendant. The state, after laying
proper foundation, introduced the test results and the defendant was
convicted. On appeal the defendant objected and urged the exclu-
sionary doctrine of Frye. The California Court of Appeals, unlike
the court in LeFevre, held that the existence of the stipulation was
significant and that the stipulation would be binding on the parties.
The court stated:
It would be difficult to hold that the defendant should now
be permitted on this appeal to take advantage of any claim
that such operator was not an expert and that as to the re-
sults of the test such evidence was inadmissible, merely be-
cause it happened to indicate that he was not telling the
truth... . a
This decision is generally credited with establishing the exception
to the general exclusionary rule. However, there is an element of
the decision that lessens its weight. There is nothing in the Houser
decision that indicates that the defendant made a timely objection
at trial. Instead, it seems that defendant objected initially on appeal.
64. 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943).
65. State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
66. For a discussion of attempted Justifications of the case see Comment, Lie Detector
Tests: Possible Admissibility Upon Stiplations, 4 J. MARsH. J. PRAC. & PRO. 244 (1971).
67. 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (DIst. Ct. App. 1948).
68. Id. at 695, 193 P.2d at 942.
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It is argued that this weakens the decision because a fact not
urged at trial cannot be raised on appeal. 9
The next case involving the stipulation exception question occur-
red in Stone v. Earp.70 In this civil action, the parties had given
conflictingstories. The judge stated that he was not going to decide
the case until both the plaintiff and the defendant had taken a lie-
detector test. Following the trial judge's statement, the parties stip-
ulated that the test results could be admitted. The results were un-
favorable to the plaintiff and the Michigan Supreme Court held that
the admitting of lie detector test results was error. The court held
lie detector tests were still in the experimental stage and that a
stipulation cannot raise the level of these tests to attain the stature
of competent evidence.71
The first appellate case which directly held that written poly-
graph stipulation would be given force and admitted over proper
objection by the defendant was State v. McNamara.7 2 As in Houser,
the prosecution and the defendant signed a stipulation that the poly-
graph test results could be admitted into evidence by either party.
On appeal the defendant urged the Iowa Supreme Court to follow
the Frye exclusionary rule despite the stipulation. The court, never-
theless, followed the reasoning of Houser that the parties should be
bound by their stipulation."
New Mexico in two recent decisions has used the exclusionary
doctrine to bar stipulated results from being admitted into evidence.7 4
Even though the stipulation was valid and proper foundation was
laid,75 evidence as to polygraph examinations and results is still
inadmissible because the procedure has not yet gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
The stipulation exception trend was aided by an enlightened
opinion written by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Valdez.
7 6
69. See Note, Evidence-Lie Detector Admissibility Under Stipulation, 15 ALA. L. REV.
248, 252 (1962). Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
70. 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951).
71. Id. at 611, 50 N.W.2d at 174, citing People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503
(1942). The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825
(Ky. Ct. 1957) also refused to allow polygraph test results in evidence even though both
parties had entered into an oral stipulation. The court held that more formality should be
required to give effect to such an agreement. The court distinguished) the Houser case on
the ground that a written stipulation was involved in that case.
72. State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
78. In State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964), the Iowa Supreme
Court refused to extend the McNamara rule to the case of unstipulated results. Thus, even
in those jurisdictions where stipulated polygraph results can be admitted, the general rule
of exclusion is still in force where no proper stipulation is created.
74. State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 404, 362 P.2d 788 (1961) ; State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786,
461 P.2d 919 (1969).
75. State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 404, -, 362 P.2d 788 (1961). The operator testified to
his experience and that verified results showed 100 per cent accuracy. The operator also
explained to the Jury how the machine worked and explained the questioning technique.
Finally, he stated his conclusions.
76. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
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In this case, the defendant, with his counsel, entered into a written
stipulation that the test results could be admitted by either side.
The court held that polygraph evidence had developed to the point
that its results were sufficiently probative to warrant admissibility,
if there existed a stipulation and the discretion of the trial judge
was not eliminated.
The Arizona Court laid down the following requirements that
would have to be met if stipulated lie detector results were to be
admitted into evidence: (1) that the prosecution and defendant both
sign a written stipulation, that defendant will submit to the test and
that it can be subsequently admitted at trial; (2) that notwithstand-
ing the stipulation, admissibility is subject to the discretion of the
judge after reviewing the examiner's qualifications and determining
whether the examination conditions were proper; (3) that the oppos-
ing party shall have the right to cross-examine the operator as to
his qualifications, the condition under which the test occurred, the
limitations and possibilities of error in the lie detection technique,
and at the discretion of the trial judge, any other matter deemed
pertinent to the inquiry; and (4) that the trial judge instruct the
jury that the expert's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove
any element of the crime, but tends only to indicate that at the
time of the examination the subject was or was not telling the
truth.
77
The trend towards admitting stipulated polygraph results has
continued though the proper foundation must be laid. 7 However,
stipulations have been held to be inadequate where the examiner
is absent from trial,79 where the defendant lacked counsel,80 where
defendant had a limited education, 8' where there has been a lack
of mutuality in consent,8 2 and where the examiner's qualifications
were not covered in the stipulation. 3
VIII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Recently, significant departures from the traditional exclusionary
rules have developed in certain federal district courts. Despite the
heavy weight of precedent, these courts have suggested that even
without a stipulation, the polygraph has a certain amount of scien-
tific validity that the courts should recognize.
77. Id. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900. These limitations are important, because they are the
only court-made procedural safeguards regarding the admissibility of lie detector results
when a prior stipulation has been made.
78. For a list of such cases, see Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973).
79. People v. Zazzeta, 27 Ill. App. 2d 302, -, 189 N.E.2d 260, 264 (196).
80. Conley v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1964).
81. United States v. Rid]ling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
82. State v. Walker, 37 N.J. 208, 181 A.2d 1 (1962).
83. Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957).
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NOTES
In the 1972 case of the United States v. Ridling,8 a United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that
a perjury defendant was entitled to submit testimony of several
polygraph experts that, based on their opinions and interpretation
of the polygraph tests, the defendant, when he made his alleged
perjured statements to the grand jury, believed the statements to
be truthful. The Court stated that "the techniques of examination
and the machine used are constantly improving and have improved
markedly in the last ten years.18 5 The court noted that the under-
lying theory of the polygraph and its reliability are firmly established
by its widespread use outside of court and by expert testimony that
the polygraph was more reliable than other types of scientific evi-
dence, when interpreted by a qualified examiner. The court also
indicated that the polygraph expert's testimony should not be con-
clusive on the jurors' minds.8 6 The court, nevertheless, conceded
that many polygraph examiners were unqualified. Thus, the court
ruled that the defendant must submit to a court appointed polygraph
examiner, who would testify to his findings. This would then be
a check on the self-serving nature of the defendant's own expert's
testimony. A further restriction in this case is that the court argued
that cases involving the issue of perjury were most aptly suited
for the use of polygraph testimony. The court felt that perjury cases
involved "willful" or "knowingly" giving false evidence and that
the polygraph was aimed exactly at this aspect of guilt.
87
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
in United Stated v. Zeiger, s also held that a polygraph expert's
opinion testimony as to his results on a test of the defendant should
be admitted. The defendant was charged with armed assault with
intent to kill. After being arrested, he signed a written stipulation
that the results would not be introduced in evidence at his trial.
Despite the stipulation, the defendant attempted to introduce the
test results. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded
that the polygraph had now established itself as a scientific tool
and was at least 85 per cent reliable. 89 The court admitted the
polygraph evidence. Note how much broader the decision was in
Zeiger than the narrow conditions of admissibility laid down in
84. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
85. Id. at 94.
86. Id. at 98. The court noted that modern juries are more educated and capable of
sorting out "good" evidence from "bad." The court further noted that modern juries al-
ready have to decide the weight of other scientific testimony such as radar speed test,
finger prints, ballistic evidence, blood tests and voice prints. Id. at 96.
87. Id. at 93, thus, Judge Joiner denied defendant's request that the polygraph be used
on all witnesses. Id. at 96.
88. 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
89. Id. at 689.
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Ridling.90 However, Zeiger was reversed per curiam by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals.91
In United States v. DeBetham,9 2 the defendant attempted to in-
troduce the results of several polygraph tests to show that he had
no knowledge that his co-defendant had heroin hidden in the car
in which they were traveling. The court stated that the higher stand-
ard set for admission of the polygraph test no longer made sense.
Instead, the normal test of scientific evidence sthould be used: that
scientists testify that the test is acceptable in his profession and
that it has a substantial measure of precision. 93 Nevertheless, the
court felt the overwhelming weight of precedent constrained it and
held that the results of the defendant's polygraph examination could
not be admitted into evidence."
IX. SHOULD POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE BE ADMITTED AT TRIAL?
These recent cases reflect an awakening attitude concerning the
admission of polygraph evidence. The cases also reflect a dissatis-
faction with the traditional exclusionary rule and the traditional
Frye rationale. The purpose of this section is to review the basic
objections to the admission of polygraph evidence and whether 52
years after Frye the objections are still valid.
A. RELIABILITY
The basic objection of most courts is that the matter of truthful-
ness cannot be uniformally determined by a mechanical instrument
in a reliable manner. Today's polygraph bears little resemblance
to the simple detection deception device used in the Frye decision.
Proponents claim that along with the evolvement of the polygraph
has come ever increasing reliability. Reid and Inbau, the leading
judicially recognized experts in their field, claim the percentage of
known errors is less than one per cent and that the margin of
error favors the innocent.95
Nevertheless, the proponents' claims are not receiving total ac-
ceptance. Various writers continue to question whether the polygraph
is reliable enough to warrant admission of test results into evidence.
90. Because the Court of Appeals filed no opinion it is not certain whether the court
relied on the Frye exclusionary rule or questioned the circumstances attendant to the
polygraph examination. Zieger did not involve the limiting instructions that were present
In Ridling.
91. 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
92. 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
93. Id. at 1384 citing C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 363-64 (1954).
94. Id. at 1391. For a further discussion of recent cases involving trial court decisions
see Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 COLUM. L. Riv. 1120, 1134 (1970).
95. Note, The Polygraph Revisited, 4 SUFFOLK L. Rv. 111, 117 (1969). These figures
represent a professional study of over 33 years. See also Burack, supra note 27, at 422.
The author states the tests can attain 99 percent accuracy when they are conducted by a
qualified examiner and thus they are probably as good as they will ever be.
NOTES
One writer questions the scientific underpinnings that polygraph evi-
dence is based on-that there exists a regular relationship between
lying and emotional states and a regular relationship between emo-
tions and bodily responsef0 Also, academic psychologists and physio-
logists challenge these underpinnings by claiming the whole area is
much more complex. 7 There exists at least nine bodily responses
somehow correlated to emotion; 9 8 the polygraph only measures four
of themY1 There also exist individuals who do not respond in the
same emotional way to lying as the normal person. Some individuals
are emotionally unresponsive such as sometimes occurs with profes-
sional criminals, pathological liars, or persons suffering from circum-
scribed amnesia. Others have physiological abnormalities such as
heart disease, respiratory disease, uncommon blood pressure, hic-
coughs, allergies or even colds that would make the polygraph re-
sults defective. 00
The chance of error is heightened by the existence of many un-
qualified examiners. A number of writers feel the crucial role the
examiner plays in itself is an objection to the instrument's reliabil-
ity.10 ' The fallibility of the human operator will always cause the
entire technique to be questionable as to its reliability. Inbau and
Reid's figure of one per cent error has not stood without attacks.
The Harvard Business Review sought to verify Inbau and Reid's
claim. They found little supporting data behind Inbau and Reid's
claims.1 0 2 Few impartial studies have been done concerning polygraph
reliability. One test by a team of psychologists found the degree of
success to be only around 70 per cent;' 0 3 while another study by
the Institute of Defense Analysis after 200,000 tests found no perform-
ance data to support the claims of Inbau and Reid.'04
B. EXAMINER'S QUALIFICATION
In addition to the fear that the polygraph is unreliable, many
96. Skolnick, supra note 14, at 699-703.
91. Id. at 703.
98. Id. at 700. The nine reactions are: skin resistance (perspiration), respiration, blood
pressure, heart rate, blood flow, skin temperature, muscle tension, pupillary diameter, gas
tric motility and blood oxygen saturation. Id.
99. Id. at 701. Those four are: blood pressure, heart rate, respiration and skin resistance
,d.
100. E.g., Highleyman, supra note 3, at 58-61. For an in depth discussion of sources of
error, see Levitt, supra note 10, at 451-4.
101. Levin, The Lie Detector Can Lie, 15 LAB. L.J. 708, 711 (1964).
102. Coghland, The Lie Box Lies, 1963 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 173, 181 (1963). The Har-
vard Business Review was only able to verify 36 percent of the reported guilty and only
11 percent of those reported innocent were later verified. The combined verification rate
was 18 percent. A claim of 95 percent accuracy with 4 percent undiagnosible, loses much
of Its weight when 81.1 percent of the findings are unverified. Inbau and Reid's figures
are also misleading in that they involve the most qualified and experienced 'examiners
under the most favorable conditions. I-ighleyman, supra note 3, at 61. Otherwise, the
figure of error may be 25 percent. Id. at 62.
103. Durkey, The Case Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 853, 856 (1967).
104. Comment, supra note 16, at 660 citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House
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writers have raised objection to unqualified examiners taking the
stand.10 5 The role of the examiner is vital in lie detection. The
Chicago Bar Association Committee on Criminal Law stated that 95
per cent of the lie detector's results are due to the efficiency and
capability of the operator and 5 per cent to the function of the
machine. 00 In fact, Inbau and Reid stated in 1964 that 80 per cent
of the examiners were incompetent to make a qualified diagnosis. 0 7
The examiners' ultimate diagnosis does not only entail examining
the polygraph, but takes into consideration the subect's behavioral
symptoms and attitudes observed during the test. Thus a high degree
of professionalism, training, and experience is necessary. Recent
studies have pointed out that experienced examiners have had a
significantly higher accuracy scores. 0 8
Thus, the polygraph examiners should establish some standards
of training and education to insure more reliable results. It could be
argued that such consideration of training and experience could be
brought out on cross-examination. But cross-examination would be
much more effective if there existed minimum standards of quali-
fication on which counsel could base his questioning.
Only a minority of the examiners have a college degree, and
many lack any understanding of the basis of the polygraph instru-
ment.10 9 The two leading proponents of the polygraph, ,Inbau and
Reid, both state that examiners should have training in psychology
and physiology and after this should undergo individualized training
for a period of about six months. 1" 0 The American Polygraph Associ-
ation has also suggested similar standards, but has been unable to
make it binding on its members."' Thus, a number of states including
North Dakota have passed legislation regulating polygraph examin-
ers." 2 No doubt this legislation is of some value in checking the pro-
blem of gross examiner incompetence, but none of the state regula-
tions recognize the Reid and Inbau recommendations. Therefore,
such legislation has not put an end to the wide disparity in examiner
qualifications nor in the wide disparity of reliability that follows as a
function of examiner experience and qualifications.
Comm. on Government Operations on the Use of the Polygraph by the Federal Govern-
ment, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-5, at 426-7 (1964).
105. Skolnick, supra note 14, at 707.
106. A Bar Association's Viewpoint Regardingg the Lie-Detector Technique, 50 J. CalM.
L.C. & P.S. 99-100 (1959).
107. Note, supra note 25, at 347.
108. Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and
Deception, 62 J .CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 276-81 (1971).
109. Note, U.S. v. Ridling, The Polygraph Breaks the Twilight Zone, 23 CATH. 'L. REv.
101, 114 (1937).
110. Inbau & Reid, supra note 15, at 471.
111. Comment, supra note 66, at 263.
112. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-31-01 to 43-31-17 (Supp. 1978).
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C. CONCLUSIVE WEIGHT DANGER
A third objection the courts have raised is the danger that the
jury will give conclusive weight to the results of the tests. A recent
poll indicates that the public believes the polygraph technique to be
infallible. 113 Also, the nature of polygraph evidence would lead to the
inherent danger of the jury relying too heavily on the results; poly-
graph testimony would not be circumstantial, but would be treated
as pertaining to the entire issue of litigation.14 Thus, there exists the
prejudicial danger that the polygraph evidence, notwithstanding its
probative value, will create a tendency in the jury to treat such evi-
dence as conclusive without reviewing the merits of the case.
It is argued that the tendency of the jury to give polygraph evi-
dence conclusive weight could be met by an instruction from the court
to the jury that the expert testimony does not tend to disprove any ele-
ment of the crime, but tends only to indicate that at the time of the
examination the subject was or was not telling the truth.1 5 Judge
Learned Hand, in similar situations has called the use of limiting in-
structions "a device which satisfies form while it violates substance;
that is, the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which
is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody else's.""16 In People v.
Kenny, 117 an early New York trial case where polygraph evidence
was introduced with a limiting instruction, the jury was polled after
trial to determine the weight they placed on such evidence. The polling
of the jurors in this case" 8 and the results from a study involving a
hypothetical case"19 both show that the lie detector was used by
the jurors as a substitute for proof of guilt on the merits. This conclu-
sive danger will only grow more dangerous as the reliability of the
technique increases. Juries then will place ever-increasing weight
on its findings. So the trial will not turn on the credibility of the wit-
nesses but rather on the issue of the credibility of the polygraph
examiners.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PROBLEMS
It is doubtless that the polygraph's accuracy and reliability
113. Note, supra note 109 at 118.
114. F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 128 (3d ed. 1953).
"If lie detector results were admitted as legal evidence, they would be offered and treated
as proof of some very important phase of the case, usually the validity of the entire claim
or contention of one of the parties." Id.
115. Note, supra note 4, at 128.
116. See Comment, Post-Conspiracy Admissions in Joint Prosecutions-Effectiveness of In-
structions Limiting the Use of Evidence to One Co-Defendant, 24 U. CMI. L. REV. 710, 711
(1957). See also Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932).
117. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens Co. Ct. 1938).
118. Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. 202, 228-38 (1939). The
poll showed that five of the ten that answered said they were so impressed by the scien-
tific value of the lie detector they they accepted its testimony without question.
119. Koffler, The Lie Detector-A Critical Appraisal of the Technique as a Potential
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have increased since the Frye case was first decided. Nevertheless,
the admission of polygraph evidence has constitutional threats and
threats to the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence that will not
disappear with technological change.
1. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Objection has been raised to the admissibility of the polygraph
evidence, when the results are unsatifactory, on the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. 120 One early writer suggested
that there would be no such violation because polygraph results
would not be considered testimonial.121 Nevertheless, the United
States Supreme Court, in Schmerber v. California,1 22 held that the
extraction of blood was not of a testimonial or communicative nature
but alluded that polygraph evidence would be. 2  No other court has
ruled specifically on whether polygraph evidence is testimonial.
However, it seems clear that the polygraph evidence is testimonial,
because of the basic theory of the technique . . . that physciological
changes are a function of psychological changes of the mind. Thus
polygraph evidence takes on a communicative nature.
The individual should have a right under the fifth amendment
to refuse to take a polygraph test. Likewise, he should be able to waive
the privilege against self-incrimination. Such a waiver should only
be given effect where there has been a, clear warning that the results
could be used against him.
2. Due Process Considerations
The dissent in People v. Schiers"4 was the first case to consider
excluding polygraph evidence for lack of due process. Lack of due
process, prohibiting the admissibility of lie detector evidence, could
be argued in two different manners.
Paramount among due process principles is that the judicial pro-
cess is to be adversary and not inquisitorial. Any democratic judicial
procedure must make the defendant a party in the proceeding and not
its mere object. It is true that under certain circumstances the defend-
ant's body may be subjected to an examination, but his freedom of
will and mind must be preserved to enable him or her to conduct the
Undermining Factor in the Judicial Process, 3 N.Y.L.F. 123, 138-146 (1957). In the ex-:
periment, third year law students were used as the jury and again a significant number
accepted the polygraph results without question.
120. Note, Hypnosis, Truth Drugs, and the Polygraph: An Analysis, of Their Use and Ac-
ceptance by the Courts, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 541, 549 (1969).
121. Hardman, Lie Detectors: Extrajudicial Investigations and the Courts, 48 W. VA.
L. REv. 37, 38-39 (1941).
122. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
123. Id. at 764.
124. 829 P.2d 1, denying rehearing to 324 P.2d 981 per curiam (Cal. 1958).
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defense. 12 American courts have never ruled on the use of lie detec-
tor evidence and its conflict with the adversary procedure. 1 28 So, as
Justice Black in Rochin v. California"72 stated, notions of due process
and justice of other nations should be viewed. The German courts
have held that such tests violate German procedure which places a
premium on the dignity of the individual. The German courts have
said that the dignity of the individual is a principle of democracy and
unlike a civil right, a single individual cannot waive it.
Arguably, polygraph testimony should not be admitted in a demo-
cratic judicial procedure."2 There exists two types of judicial sy-
stems, authoritarian and democratic. In an authoritarian system,
means are judged by their efficiency and the output is the significant
feature. This is repugnant to a democratic procedure where there
is no talk of means and ends. Each step is significant in itself. Kant in-
dicates that a man is not a mere means to other men's ends, but must
be accorded significance as an end in himself. 29 The polygraph denies
the individual's dignity in that his unconscious is surveyed while he
is present in body, but not in mind.
The due process objection cannot only be based on the denial of
individual dignity, but it can also be based on the denial of fairness.
Because there is no case law on the point, it may be helpful to view
cases involving anlogous situations concerning confessions and due
process standards. In both Rochin v. California'"0 and Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia,'31 the Supreme Court held that fairness and decency is
fundamental to due process. This is the due process standard that
the polygraph will have to confront to be admitted. On this point
there is a dissenting view. The court in People v. Schiers,13 2 argued
that the lie detector violated the traditions of our law, citing'the Ger-
man example. The admission of lie detector results would be unfair
because one side would have an overwhelming advantage due to
the conclusive nature of such testimony. There could be no fair
trail on the merits. In other areas the law has recognized that fair-
ness demands equalizing positions. 33 For this reason the prosecu-
tion in a criminal case cannot introduce character evidence to infer
125. Siving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REV. 683-695
(1956). Justice Douglas, concurring in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), argued
that an accused can be compelled to be present at the trial, to stand, to sit, to turn this
way or that, and to try on a can or a coat, -but that words taken from his lips, capsules
taken from his stomach, blood taken from his veins are all inadmissible piovided' they are
taken from him without his consent.
126. Silving, supra note 124, at 687.
127. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
128. Shiving, supra note 124 at 687-695.
129. Id. at 693-4.
130. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
131. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
132. 329 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1958).
133. Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of Its Place in the Law of Evidence, 10
WAYNE L. REV. 381, 412-18 (1964).
NOTES 697
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the probable doing of an act. Secondly, for the same policy reasons,
statutues in most jurisdictions preclude the survivor of a trans-
action from testifying in a lawsuit against the successors of the
.deceased party to the transaction.1 3'
X. CONCLUSION
The general exclusionary rule of inadmissibility of polygraph
evidence at trial has caused dissatisfaction. This is reflected in the
stipulation exception trend and- recent developments mentioned in
this note. Nevertheless, it is time to stop and evaluate this dissatis-
faction. The admission of lie detector testimony would revolution-
ize the whole system of trials and administration of justice. If such
test results were alowed into evidence, the jury would tend to con-
clude that the defendant was guilty by merely not offering such evi-
dence. The adversary system we now have would be displaced by
an inquisitorial system where the defendant would be an object of
the proceeding, not a party to the proceeding. The admission of such
evidence ultimately comes down to the basic policy issue of truth
versus dignity. In the administration of democratic justice, truth
is but a means where as dignity is an end. The fourth and fifth amend-
ments are but two examples of the sacrifice of efficient methods for
individual dignity and fairness. The lie detector's probing of the sub-
conscious is repugnant to such values which are the ends of a demo-
cratic judicial process.
RONALD H. MCLEAN
134. 2 J. WIGMORZ, EvrENCE § 578 (2d d, 1923).
